



DutchGrid and NIKHEF
Medium-security X.509
Certification Authority

Certification Policy and Practice Statement



Administered and operated by NIKHEF
as a courtesy service for the DutchGrid platform

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I INTRODUCTION

This Certification Policy and Practice Statement (CP/CPS) is written according to the framework laid out by RFC 2527. It describes the set of rules and procedures adhered to by the *DutchGrid and NIKHEF medium-security Certification Authority*, operated by the Certification Authorities group of the Dutch National Institute for Nuclear and High-Energy Physics (NIKHEF) as a courtesy service to the DutchGrid community.

This document is a draft, currently at version 2.0-alpha. Upon completion, the document is to be referred to as *the DutchGrid and NIKHEF medium-security certification authority certification policy and practice statement, version 2*.

1.1 Overview

The DutchGrid and NIKHEF medium-security certification authority certification policy and practice statement, version 2 is a statement of practices, which the DutchGrid medium-security CA employs in issuing public-key certificates.

A public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate") binds a public-key value to a set of information that identifies the entity (such as person, organisation, account, or site) associated with use of the corresponding private key (this entity is known as the "subject" of the certificate). A certificate is used by a "certificate user" or "relying party" that needs to use, and rely upon the accuracy of, the public key distributed via that certificate. A certificate user is typically an entity that is verifying a digital signature from the certificate's subject or an entity sending encrypted data to the subject.

The degree to which a certificate user can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and security controls; the subject's obligations (for example, in protecting the private key); and the stated undertakings and legal obligations of the CA (for example, warranties and limitations on liability).

1.2 Identification

This document is named the DutchGrid and NIKHEF medium-security certification authority certification policy and practice statement, version 2. The currently valid version of the text is available from <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/policy/>.

The following ASN.1 object identifier has been assigned to this CP/CPS: 1.3.6.1.4.1.10434.4.2.2.1.2.0.

The current version is **draft-2.0-alpha**, dated September 21, 2001.

1.3 Community and Applicability

1.3.1 Certification authorities

The only entities that issue certificates of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are persons, which means that no automated issuing is allowed. These persons are formally assigned staff members responsible for the operational service of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority. The current list of persons comprising the operational staff of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is published in an on-line accessible repository. The location of this list is stated as part of the CPS in section 1.4.

The assigned staff operate the CA functions on a best-effort basis only. The NIKHEF collaboration, the foundation FOM and/or the NIKHEF partners cannot be held liable for any damages resulting from the operation or non-operation of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

No subordinate certification authorities will be allowed under this policy. Distributed validation will be implemented using a network of trusted registration authorities (RA's).

1.3.2 Registration authorities

Individuals or groups of individuals can be recognised by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority to act as trusted intermediaries in the identity verification process between subscriber and certification authority. Such trusted intermediaries are formally assigned by the CA and their identities and contact details published in an on-line accessible repository, the location of which is stated in section 1.4.

The RA's are required to sign a document declaring their understanding of and adherence to this CP/CPS.

1.3.3 End entities

Certificates can be issued to natural persons and to computer entities. The entities that are eligible for certification by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are:

- all those entities related to organisations, formally based in and/or having offices inside the Netherlands, that are involved in the research or deployment of multi-domain distributed computing infrastructure, intended for cross-organisational sharing of resources. The focus of these organisations should also be in research and/or education.
- all those entities associated to the DutchGrid platform.
- all organisations located in the "Wetenschappelijk Centrum Watergraafsmeer" in Amsterdam, that are run entirely on a non-for-profit basis.

1.3.4 Applicability

The certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority may not be used for financial transactions. Other than that, these certificates may be used for any application that is suitable for X.509 certificates.

1.4 Contact Details

1.4.1 Specification administration organisation

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is administered by the Dutch "Nationaal Instituut voor Kernfysica en Hoge-Energie Fysica (NIKHEF)" as part of its DataGrid project effort by David Groep. It is operated by the NIKHEF Computer Technology Group (CT).

The contact person for this CP/CPS is:

David Groep, DutchGrid and NIKHEF CA operations,
P.O. Box 41882, NL-1009 DB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
phone: +31 20 592 2179, telefax: +31 20 592 5155, telex: 10262 hef nl
e-mail: ca@nikhef.nl.

1.4.1.1 Online repositories

general web address <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/>

policy documents <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/policy/>

certificate repository

<http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/>
<ldap://certificate.nikhef.nl/o=dutchgrid>

certificate revocation list <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/cacrl.pem>

root certificate <http://certificate.nikhef.nl/medium/cacert.pem>

1.4.2 Contact person

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is operated (as meant by section 1.3.1) by:

- David Groep, NIKHEF, phone +31 20 592 2179
- Djuhaeri Harapan, NIKHEF, phone +31 20 592 2139

The Registration Authorities for the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are:

- David Groep, NIKHEF, phone +31 20 592 2179
- Djuhaeri Harapan, NIKHEF, phone +31 20 592 2139
- Zeger Hendrikse, University of Amsterdam Informatics Institute, phone: +31 20 525 7535

1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

Not applicable.

II GENERAL PROVISIONS

2.1 Obligations

2.1.1 CA obligations

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will develop and maintain this document to reflect in detail the practices and procedures by which the CA will operate. The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority ensures that all aspects of the CA services, operations and infrastructure related to the certificates issued under this policy are performed in accordance with the requirements of this policy. The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will generate and suitably protect the private key used for signing certificates under this policy.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will accept requests for certification by all entities eligible for certification under this policy, as detailed in section 1.1.3. The CA will authenticate these entities according to the procedures outlined in this document and issue signed certificates based on these requests if and only if the requirements detailed in this document are satisfied. The subscriber will be notified of the issuing of the certificate by electronic mail, sent to the address where the request originated or the address contained in the certificate request.

In special cases, an alternate e-mail address communicated to the CA operator by out-of-band means can be used. Such a case will be explicitly noted in the audit trail associated with the request.

The certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority under this policy will contain a reference to the policy object identifier as part of the "certificatePolicies" certificate extension. A reference to an on-line repository containing the CP/CPS will be part of the comments-extension of the certificate.

All certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will be published in a publicly-accessible on-line repository.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will accept revocation requests according to the procedures outlined in this document. Entities requesting revocation will be authenticated by the CA or its assigned RA.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will issue a Certificate Revocation List. This CRL will be published in a publicly-available on-line repository.

By issuing a certificate that references this policy, the certifies to the subscriber and to all qualified relying parties who reasonably and in good faith rely on the information contained in the certificate during its operational period, that the CA has issued and will manage the certificate in accordance with this policy, as stated in the certificate extensions. Also, the CA certifies that there are no misrepresentations of fact in the certificate known to the CA, and the CA has taken reasonable steps to verify any additional information in the certificate. Also, the certificate meets all material requirements of this CP/CPS. No other liability, either expressed or implied, is accepted with regard to the certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will retain a repository of the information pertaining to the certificates issued. This repository is intended to:

- establish an authentication binding between the request and the identity of the subscriber. This binding includes the affiliation of the subscriber with the organisation mentioned in the certificate subject.
- provide a means a contact the subscriber about expiration or revocation of the subscriber's certificate.
- provide an audit trail of the certification and identity verification procedure for auditing of the CA operations with respect to this CP/CPS.

This repository is not available externally in an automated way. Access to this repository is restricted to CA operational

staff and to assigned internal or external auditors of the CA. The repository will not hold more information than:

- Name of subscriber
- affiliation of subscriber to the level of detail as stated in the certificate
- electronic mail addresses of subscriber
- telephone numbers and call logs related to the authentication verification procedure
- physical addresses and or location of subscriber at the time of identity verification
- serial numbers of identity card shown during the verification process
- the name(s) of the RA or RA's involved in the verification process

The information contained in this repository will not be made available to any party but the CA operations staff and the internal or external auditors as part of their assigned duty.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority also operates an on-line public repository of all certificates issued. This repository will contain no data about the subscriber, except for such data as contained within the certificate. In particular, no sensitive private data, no data concerning the identification procedure and no specific address information will be maintained in this repository. Professional affiliation is not to be considered sensitive private data.

2.1.2 RA obligations

A Registration Authority shall validate requests for certification. The authentication of the identity of the subject shall be in accordance with chapter 3 of this CP/CPS. An RA shall validate the connection between the public key contained in the request and the identity of the requester.

An RA shall verify to a reasonable extent that the private key pertaining to the certification request is in the possession of the requesting entity. This verification may be out-of-band and may rely on non-technical means.

An RA shall confirm any such validation versus the CA via a reliable and trusted mechanism. This may be either via personal contact between the RA and the CA (by phone or in person), or via cryptographically non-repudiable and integrity protected electronic means.

Entities that act as RA for the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority have no notification obligations when certificates are issued, revoked or suspended.

2.1.3 Subscriber obligations

Subscribers to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority have the obligation to ensure that the data represented in the certification request is accurate. The subscriber will generate a key pair in a trustworthy manner, and has the obligation to protect the private key against disclosure or unintended usage. Specifically, it should be stored only in encrypted form. The pass phrase protecting the private key should be strong and at least 8 characters in length. This requirement is waived for subscribers that are automated entities, in which case they private key should be accessible only by those applications, services or systems. Such certificates will be distinguishable by subject name, as detailed in section 3.1.1.

The encrypted private key may be stored on a publicly accessible medium. The certificate must only be used for purposes consistent with this policy.

The subscriber must instruct the CA to revoke the certificate promptly upon any actual or suspected loss, disclosure or other compromise of the subscribers private key.

By making a certificate request to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority, the subscriber or potential subscriber accepts the registration of such data in all the repositories described in section 2.1.1. The subscriber is allowed to correct or complete the data retained in these repositories by contacting the CA operator stated in section 1.4, in accordance with the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) 2000. Request to remove data from this repository will result in immediate and irreversible revocation of the certificate(s) pertaining to the subscriber. In case of removal of subscriber data from the repository, an audit trail pertaining to this removal will be retained by the CA.

2.1.4 Relying party obligations

Qualified relying parties are expected to rely on certificates that reference this Policy and Practice Statement as appropriate authentication of the subscriber if:

- The relying party is familiar with this CP/CPS before drawing any conclusion on trust of a certificate issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority,
- The reliance is reasonable and in good faith, in light of all the circumstances known to the relying party at the time of the reliance,
- The purpose for which the certificate was used was appropriate under this CP/CPS,
- The relying party accepts all limitations on the liability of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority, as detailed in section 2.2,
- The relying party checked the status of the certificate prior to every reliance. Specifically, they have to check whether the validity period has expired and if the certificate has been included in the most recent Certificate Revocation List issues by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority,
- The relying party has checked the authenticity of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority root certificate before using it.

2.1.5 Repository obligations

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will maintain an on-line accessible repository of valid certificates, and of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will not publish pending certification requests.

Issued certificates are published within one hour after issuing. Revoked certificates are published within one hour after revocation by including them in a Certificate Revocation List.

The contact addresses for the online repositories are stated in section 1.4.

The repository is operated at a best-effort basis, where the intended availability is continuous.

2.2 Liability

2.2.1 CA liability

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will not give any guarantees about the security or suitability of the service; it is provided on a best-effort basis only. NIKHEF, the FOM foundation, the DutchGrid Platform or its personnel or partners are not to be held liable for any damages, including but not limited to lost profit, list savings and incidental or consequential damages. The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is not to be held legally responsible for problems arise out of its operation, or for problems relating to the use or misuse of the certificates it issues. It is explicitly prohibited to use the certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority under this policy for any kind of financial transactions or for any kind of trade.

2.2.2 RA liability

See section 2.2.1.

2.3 Financial responsibility

No financial responsibility is accepted by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

2.3.1 Indemnification by relying parties

Parties that rely on certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority indemnify the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority for any financial responsibility.

2.3.2 Fiduciary relationships

There are no fiduciary relationships defined in this CP/CPS.

2.3.3 Administrative processes

NIKHEF finances the operations of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority, with regard to equipment and personnel cost. No other costs are to be covered by NIKHEF, its partners, the foundation FOM or the DutchGrid platform. The contribution by NIKHEF is voluntary and may be withdrawn at any time without prior notice to subscribers and relying parties.

Costs related to auditing are not covered by NIKHEF, its partners, the foundation FOM or by any institution charged with the operation of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement

2.4.1 Governing law

Interpretation of this policy is according to the Law of The Netherlands.

2.4.2 Severability, survival, merger, notice

NIKHEF intends to continue operations of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority for a period of at least 6 month after the validity period of the last certificate has ended. This intention does not constitute a legally binding guarantee to continue the activities of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority for this period.

Before termination of the CA, the CA will notify all its subscribers, all cross-certifying CAs, and any relying parties known to the CA to be currently and actively relying on the certificate issues by the CA.

2.4.3 Dispute resolution procedures

In case of a dispute based on the contents of this CPS, the Director of NIKHEF will be the sole person responsible for resolution of the problem. The complainant cannot take legal action against NIKHEF, any of the NIKHEF partners, the foundation FOM, the DutchGrid platform of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority operating body.

2.5 Fees

No fees are charged for any service provided by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

2.5.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees

See section 2.5.

2.5.2 Certificate access fees

See section 2.5.

2.5.3 Revocation or status information access fees

See section 2.5.

2.5.4 Fees for other services such as policy information

See section 2.5.

2.5.5 Refund policy

See section 2.5.

2.6 Publication and Repository

2.6.1 Publication of CA information

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority operates an on-line repository, that contains:

- the CA certificate for its signing key,
- all certificates issued under this CP/CPS,
- a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), signed by the CA,
- all past and current versions of the CP/CPS.

The information in these repositories regarding issued certificates and revoked certificates is updated as soon as possible, but certainly within one hour of the issuing or revocation.

2.6.2 Frequency of publication

The information in the public repositories defined in section 2.6.1 is available permanently, on a best-effort basis.

There is no automatic periodic renewal of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority CRL; updates are done manually. A new CRL will be issued within one hour after every revocation, and at least 7 days before expiration of the previously issued CRL.

2.6.3 Access controls

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority imposes no access control on this CP/CPS and on the CRL. There is no access control on the publication of issued certificates, although the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority reserves the right to impose such access controls when needed for reasons of proper system maintenance and to prevent abuse of the data contained in the certificates.

2.6.4 Repositories

An on-line repository will be maintained at the location specified in section 1.4.

2.7 Compliance audit

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will cooperate with a compliance audit at least once every year, when requested by relying parties that are directly subordinate to the main or associated partners in the DataGrid project (EU IST project 2000-25182). Any costs associated to such compliance audit are to be born by the requesting party.

2.7.1 Frequency of entity compliance audit

No stipulation.

2.7.2 Identity/qualifications of auditor

No stipulation.

2.7.3 Auditor's relationship to audited party

No stipulation.

2.7.4 Topics covered by audit

No stipulation.

2.7.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

No stipulation.

2.7.6 Communication of results

The result of any compliance audit, conducted by a qualified party approved by both the audit requester and the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority, will be publicly available in the on-line accessible repository referenced in section 1.4.

2.8 Confidentiality

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority collects personal data about subscribers. This data collection is subject to the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) 2000. The subscriber acknowledges that such data is being collected by the CA and permits storage of any such data in the secure repository intended in section 2.1.2 according to the stipulations made therein.

2.8.1 Types of information to be kept confidential

Any data part of the verification audit trail, and any data collected during the validation process is considered confidential.

2.8.2 Types of information not considered confidential

Any data contained in the subscribers certificate and any data contained in CRL's is not considered confidential.

2.8.3 Disclosure of certificate revocation/suspension information

No details about the revocation are currently disclosed in a public repository. Qualified relying parties may inquire about the reason for revocation, and will be notified of such reason to the level of detail specified in the CRL reason field as defined in OID 2.5.29.21.

A reason field compliant with OID 2.5.29.21 may be included in the CRL at any time by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

No other details concerning the revocation are disclosed.

2.8.4 Release to law enforcement officials

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will not disclose certificate or certificate related information to any third party, above that what is part of the certificate, except when ordered by a judge or examining judge (rechter of rechter-commissaris).

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will take care that no information will be available except for what is required for authentication validation purposes required under this CP/CPS. Any unneeded information will be securely and completely destroyed.

2.8.5 Release as part of civil discovery

See section 2.8.4.

2.8.6 Disclosure upon owner's request

No information will be disclosed unless requested by the subscriber in a hand-signed request and upon presentation of proper proof of identity.

2.8.7 Other information release circumstances

An auditor doing a formal compliance audit may have access to all confidential data contained in the secure repository specified in section 2.1.1. The auditor will not have access to cryptographic keys that are part of the CA infrastructure. The repository does not contain private keys of subscribers.

Any auditor will be required in writing to agree keeping all confidential data secret and not to publish it in any reports.

2.9 Intellectual Property Rights

This document is formatted according to RFC 2527 by Chokhani and Ford (ISOC 1999), and loosely inspired by the Gridforum CP draft as of September 2001 by Butler and Genovese (GGF 2001), by the SURFnet PCA CPS version 1.1 by T. Nijssen (Surfnet bv 2001), and by the INFN CA draft version 0.3 by R. Cecchini (INFN 2001).

This text may be used by others without prior approval; acknowledgements are welcomed but not required.

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No intellectual property rights are claimed on issued certificates or certificate revocation lists.

III IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

This chapter describes the procedures used to identify and authenticate certificate requesters to a RA or CA before certificate issuance. It also describes how parties requesting re-keying or revocation are authenticated. This chapter also details naming practices.

3.1 Initial Registration

3.1.1 Types of names

Each entity has a clear and unique Distinguished Name in the certificate subject field, structured according to X.501.

Any name under this CP/CPS will start with "O=dutchgrid". Thereafter, the subscribers class, defined as either "users", "hosts" or "servers", shall be attached in the form "O=class". The "users" class shall contain only certificates for subscribers that are natural persons. The "hosts" class shall contain only certificates for subscribing entities that are automated systems, applications or services. The private key for "hosts" certificates may be stored in an unencrypted form. The "servers" class shall contain only certificates for subscribers that are automated systems, applications or services. The private key for such entities must be stored in proper encrypted form only.

The subject name must contain the affiliation of the subscriber to his organisation. This organisation must be one of the organisational end-entities detailed in section 1.3.3. If an organisation consists of multiple administrative divisions, the division name must be included in the subject name as an organizationalUnit. Changes in division name that do not change the organisational layout of an organisation, do not constitute reason to invalidate the current unit name.

The subject name must contain the full name of the subscriber. In case the subscriber is a natural person, this name must correspond the his name given at birth. In case more than one first name is associated with the subscriber, no more then one of these need be specified in the subject name; which first name is included is left to the subscriber. Additional attributes may be post pended to the full name of the subscriber. Such attributes will be clearly separated from this full name.

In case the subscriber is a internetwork entity, the fully-qualified domain name (FQDN) must be used in the subject. In case no such FQDN is assigned, the entity is not eligible for certification under this policy. The FQDN may be preceded by an identifier representing a network service. The domain name part of the FQDN will be used as an organizationalUnitName. Hosts contained within the same logical network entity may be aggregated into the same organisational unit, even when the domain name part is different.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The subject and issuer names contained in a certificate must be meaningful and have a reasonable association with the authenticated names of the end-entities. The name used for the organisation may be a commonly recognised colloquial name. The name used for a natural person must map on the full name of such person given at birth. No name associated with an assumed identity, re-assigned identity or alias can be used.

3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name forms

See section 3.1.1.

3.1.4 Uniqueness of names

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will assert to a reasonable level that the subject name is globally unique. At least, any name shall be unique within the ensemble of certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

3.1.5 Name claim dispute resolution procedure

Name claim disputes are settled at the sole discretion of the CA administrator, referred to in section 1.4.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of trademarks

See section 3.1.5.

3.1.7 Method to prove possession of private key

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority proves possession of the private key that is the companion to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority root certificate by issuing certificates and signing CRL's.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority verifies the possession of the private relating to certificates requests by out-of-band, non-technical means at the time of authentication. Such verification may take the form of a directly posed question to requester. A cryptographic challenge- response exchange may be used to prove possession of the private key at any point in time before certification of subscriber.

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will not generate the key pair for subscribers and will not accept or retain private keys generated by subscribers.

3.1.8 Authentication of organisation identity

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority authenticates organisations by checking:

- that the organisation is known to its peers to be part of the distributed and grid computing effort in the Netherlands, or that the organisation is located at the Wetenschappelijk Centrum Watergraafsmeer by checking with the Directors of the WTCW NV,
- that the organisation is operating in the Netherlands, by checking organisation contact information,
- that the organisation is involved in research or education, by personal contact with either its peers or its (former) students.

The name of the organisation will be validated at the description of the CA administrator mentioned in section 1.4, by checking its public presence.

3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity

Certificates issued by the CA bind a subject name to an identified entity that is in possession of the private key pertaining to that certificate. This binding will be authenticated by the CA or its assigned RA's. In case the entity is a natural person, this authentication will be based on suitable identification documents or firm personal acquaintance by the CA or RA, testified to in writing by such RA.

In case the entity to be certified is a machine or software component, the requester (a natural person) shall prove to the satisfaction of the CA and RA that the binding will be to the service or system defined in the subject and that the requester is adequately authorised.

For subscribers, the CA shall ensure that the applicants identity is verified in accordance with this CP/CPS. In addition, the CA and RA shall record the process followed for issuance of each certificate. This record shall include:

- The identity of the person performing the identification,
- a signed declaration by that person that he has verified the identity of the subscriber as required by this policy,

- either the type and unique number of the proof of identity presented by subscriber, or a written statement by the verified that he has firm personal acquaintance with the subscriber,
- the date and time of verification
- the date, time and reason of any failed attempts at verification,
- a declaration of identity, signed by a handwritten signature of the certificate applicant; this declaration requirement is waived if the RA or CA has firm personal acquaintance with the applicant and the applicant is not identified in-person.

For authentication identification, the applicant must appear in-person before the RA or CA and show at least one of either a passport, a Dutch driving license or a European Identity Card. The RA or CA will meet the holder in-person and compare the photographs and will register the number of the identity piece. The RA and CA will make sure that the subject name of the certificate is non-null. In case of a natural person, the subject name must be conforming to the full name shown of the identity piece.

In case the RA or CA has firm personal knowledge about the identity of the requester, and can positively identify requester by voice, a phone conversation verifying that the requester made this request, and during which the integrity of the request is checked by comparing fingerprints or content data, the requirement of an in-person appearance is waived. Such form of authentication shall be stated on the audit record. Only RA's designated as such in section 1.4.2 of this document may testify on the identity of applicants in this way.

The affiliation of application with the organisation mentioned in the request is performed by checking public databases maintained by such organisation, or by written statement by such organisation testifying said affiliation to the RA or CA. When phone identity verification is used in the authorization process, the phone number used must be within the number range or ranges assigned to the organisation.

Machines and object are authorised by contacting the natural person responsible for such machine or object. This responsible will be authorised in accordance with the stipulation made in this section.

Any information exchanged between the RA and the CA shall be either by strong cryptographic means, or shall be verified by out-of-band methods in a phone conversation with firm positive identification by both parties (CA and RA) involved.

The certificate is send to the subscriber at the electronic mail address provided within or as part of the request. On request of the subscriber, the certificate may be delivered by other suitable means.

Since no private keys are generated by the CA, these need not be delivered to the subscriber.

3.2 Routine Re-key

The CA will allow routine re-keying before expiration of the subscribers current certificate. The re-key request must be accompanied by a request based on a new key pair. Recertification of the existing public key is not allowed.

Re-key authentication may be be the procedure detailed in section 3.1.9, or by signing the re-key request with a current, valid private key, provided that the last identification according to 3.1.9 is not longer ago than 10 years.

3.3 Re-key after Revocation

A revoked key will not be re-certified. The authentication of a new certificate request follows the rules specified in section 3.1.

3.4 Revocation Request

A revocation request needs to be authenticated, unless the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority can independently verify that a key compromise has happened. Authentication can be by the procedure described in section 3.1, or via a digitally signed message with a non-expired and non previously revoked certificate issued under this policy, regardless of the CP/CPS version.

IV OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Certificate Application

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will reject certificate applications that are not legitimate; in case a valid electronic mail address is supplied as part of the request, the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority may notify such applicant of this rejection. Obvious nonsense requests will be discarded without notification.

Applicants must generate their own key pair; the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will never generate a key pair for an applicant. The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority does not accept secret key escrow responsibilities and will reject requests that contain a private key.

The minimum key length for all applications is at least 1024 bits. The maximum validity period for a certificate is related to the key length, such that keys with a length of 1024 bits are signed for a period of at most 1 year, and keys with a length of 2048 bits are signed for a period of at most 5 years. The default validity period is 1 year.

Certificate application is by submitting a PEM-formatted certificate request by electronic mail to `ca@nikhef.nl`, or by any other secure on-line procedure provided by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority. In case the requester is a natural person requesting his or her own certificate, the procedures detailed in section 3.1 apply. In case the entity is a machine or object, the certificate request may be signed by a valid certificate pertinent to the authorised administrator or responsible for the object of machine. Otherwise, such administrator or responsible will be authenticated using the procedures detailed in section 3.1.

4.2 Certificate Issuance

On receipt of a certificate request that qualified according to this CP/CPS, the CA or RA will carefully check the compliance and validity of any documents presented by the subscribers. After successful authentication, the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will issue a certificate. Such issuance will be notified to the subscriber at the electronic mail address specified as part of the request. On request of the subscriber, another means of communication may be selected. If the communication fails permanently, the certificate may be revoked without further notice. No confirmation of receipt of electronic mail notification is done.

A request for certification is normally handled within one week, however during summer vacation periods, and during the period around Christmas and New Year, the response period may be three weeks.

4.3 Certificate Acceptance

No stipulation.

4.4 Certificate Suspension and Revocation

4.4.1 Circumstances for revocation

A certificate will be revoked when the information it contains is suspected to be incorrect or when the secret key pertaining to the certificate is compromised or suspected to be compromised. This includes situation where:

- the subscribers data as represented in the certificate have changed (name changed, machine or object decommissioned, organisation dissolved or no longer eligible under the criteria detailed in section 1.1.3),
- the subscribers data is suspected to be inaccurate,
- the associated private key has been compromised or misused,
- the associated private key is suspected to have been compromised or misused,
- the subscriber is known to have violated his obligations with regard to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

4.4.2 Who can request revocation

A certificate revocation can be requested by the holder of the certificate or by the CA or RA that issued or was part of the issuance of the certificate. Also, any person currently responsible for a certified machine or object can request revocation.

Other entities may request revocation, presenting event proof of knowledge of the private key compromise or change of subscriber's data.

4.4.3 Procedure for revocation request

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will handle request for revocation that reach is by any means, authenticated or unauthenticated. If the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority can independently verify that a certificate has been compromised or misused, DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will revoke the certificate. In all other cases, the request for revocation will be authenticated as detailed in section 3.3.

4.4.4 Revocation request grace period

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority has a maximum response time of two days (excluding weekends and public holidays in the Netherlands, and excluding the period between Christmas and New Year) for revocations; it will however handle revocation requests with priority as soon as the request is recognised as such.

4.4.5 Circumstances for suspension

No stipulation.

4.4.6 Who can request suspension

No stipulation.

4.4.7 Procedure for suspension request

No stipulation.

4.4.8 Limits on suspension period

No stipulation.

4.4.9 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)

CRL's are issued within one hour after every certificate revocation, and at least seven days before expiration of the last-issued CRL. The maximum validity period of a CRL is 30 days.

4.4.10 CRL checking requirements

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority does not offer on-line status checking other than by checking its repositories.

4.4.11 On-line revocation/status checking availability

Not applicable.

4.4.12 On-line revocation checking requirements

Not applicable.

4.4.13 Other forms of revocation advertisements available

There are not alternative advertisements available.

4.4.14 Checking requirements for other forms of revocation advertisements

Not applicable.

4.4.15 Special requirements re key compromise

No stipulation.

4.5 Security Audit Procedures

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will retain records of those actions detailed in this section. Such audit information is not publicly available. Auditors will have access to such information as part of their duties, and are obliged to keep any such information secret and not to public it in any report.

4.5.1 Types of event recorded

The following events are audited:

- all boots of the ca operation machine,
- any interactive logins on this system,
- periodic message digests of all system files on the ca system.

4.5.2 Frequency of processing log

No stipulation.

4.5.3 Retention period for audit log

The minimum retention period is three years.

4.5.4 Protection of audit log

Audit logs are copied periodically, but at least once every month, to removable media in encrypted archives. Such encrypted archives are protected with a pass phrase of at least 15 characters.

4.5.5 Audit log backup procedures

See section 4.5.4.

4.5.6 Audit collection system (internal vs external)

No stipulation.

4.5.7 Notification to event-causing subject

Entities that cause an audit event are not explicitly notified of the audit action.

4.5.8 Vulnerability assessments

No stipulation.

4.6 Records Archival

4.6.1 Types of event recorded

The following events are recorded in either digital or paper-based archives:

- certification requests,
- issued certificates, where a paper-log is maintained including an audit trail containing: the CA operator, check marks for subject name validity, organisation affiliation, acceptable DN form, and key length; contact information about any in-person or by-phone validation procedures, including date and time of any such interactions; Serial numbers and types of identity documents (when applicable); certificate serial number; certificate validity in days; method and address of certification notification; signature of CA operator; any details regarding the verification attempt(s),
- issued CRL's,
- all electronic mail sent to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority,
- all electronic mail sent by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority,
- all signed agreements with other parties.

4.6.2 Retention period for archive

The minimum retention period is three years.

4.6.3 Protection of archive

The electronic part of the archive, that includes the electronic mail exchange, is part of the regular back-up procedure of NIKHEF, which implied daily tape backups at a different physical location. Access to the electronic mail archive is controlled by Unix-style permissions.

The paper-based verification trail is stored on paper in a locked or CA-staffed office at NIKHEF.

4.6.4 Archive backup procedures

See section 4.6.3.

4.6.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

All on-line archives are time-stamped using an NTP-synchronised host clock. Off-line archives are time-stamped using un-synchronized time sources, periodically verified against an absolute time source.

4.6.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

The on-line records are stored in two physically different locations.

4.6.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

No stipulation.

4.7 Key changeover

A new public key of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is posted in the on-line repository mentioned in section 1.4. In addition, signed electronic mail is sent to relevant relying parties, in particular the mailing list `dg-eur-ca@services.cnrs.fr`.

4.8 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

If the private key of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is compromised or suspected to be compromised, the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will

- inform subscribers, relevant relying parties and all cross-certifying CAs,
- terminate the certificate and CRL distribution for the certificates or CRL's issued using the compromised private key.

If a RA's private key is compromised or suspected to be compromised, the RA shall inform the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority and request revocation of the RA's certificate.

If an entities private key is compromised or suspected to be compromised, the entity or its administrator or responsible must request revocation of the certificate and inform any relevant relying parties.

4.8.1 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

The private keys of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are only available in encrypted form on media stored in a secure location. The machine used to activate the private key is not accessible via any network. If the machine and/or the media are lost, this will be handled as a major compromise that implies generating a new key pair and terminating all services associated with the lost key pair.

If the hardware or software of the ca activation machine become corrupt, the status will be diagnosed and suitably repaired. If there is any doubt about the extent of the damage involved, this will imply rebuilding the machine from scratch, using original supplied parts and software distributions.

If data becomes corrupted, the cause will be diagnosed and the data restored from the latest back-up.

4.8.2 Entity public key is revoked

See section 4.8.

4.8.3 Entity key is compromised

See section 4.8.

4.8.4 Secure facility after a natural or other type of disaster

In case of (natural) disaster, the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority administrator(s) will as soon as physically possible confirm that all CA activation materials are at the intended locations. Depending on the situation, disaster recovery will start.

4.9 CA Termination

Termination of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority occurs when all service associated with the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is terminated permanently. In this case, the CA will:

- inform all subscribers, cross-certifying CA's, and all relying parties with which the CA has established relations,
- make publicly available information of its termination,
- stop distributing certificates and CRL's.

V PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

5.1 Physical Controls

5.1.1 Site location and construction

The CA machine is a dedicated Dell Intel-Linux system, located in the central computing room of NIKHEF. This hall contains all other key services of NIKHEF and is part of a superstructure containing one of the housing locations of the Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AmsIX). This machine is only accessible in-person by properly authorised personnel. It is located in a separate locked cabinet.

5.1.2 Physical access

Physical access to the computer room is via two wooden doors, equipped with an audit access control system based on encoded magnetic keys. Entry into this room is logged and monitored full-time using video camera's. Access is restricted to authorised personnel of the NIKHEF Computer Technology Group.

The machine containing the encrypted activation tokens has no connection to any electronic network. The enabling of the system is secured by a 'BIOS' password of seven characters. The machine is configured to boot only from its internal, non-removable media. Removable media systems attached to the machine are an Iomega ZIP drive and a CD-ROM; these are not configured for booting.

5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

No stipulation.

5.1.4 Water exposures

No stipulation.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

No stipulation.

5.1.6 Media storage

Backups of this machine are stored in encrypted form only in an adjacent secure location.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

No stipulation.

5.1.8 Off-site backup

There is no off-site backup of the activation tokens.

5.2 Procedural Controls

5.2.1 Trusted roles

No stipulation.

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

There is no requirement within the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority to act within any role in the presence of more than one person.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

No stipulation.

5.3 Personnel Controls

5.3.1 Background, qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

The role of the CA requires a suitably trained person that is familiar with the importance of a PKI, and who is technically and professionally competent. There are no background checks of clearance procedures for trusted or other roles.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

See section 5.3.1.

5.3.3 Training requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence

No stipulation.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorised actions

No stipulation.

5.3.7 Contracting personnel requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

No stipulation.

VI TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

Key pairs for the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are generated exclusively by DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority staff members on a dedicated, disconnected system, using a recent, trustworthy version of the OpenSSL software package.

End entities cryptographic keys are only generated locally by their application and never sent to the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to entity

Not applicable.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

The entity must submit a certificate request with the public key according to the procedures detailed in section 4.1.

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to users

The certificate will be delivered in PEM format according to the procedures detailed in section 4.2.

6.1.5 Key sizes

The RSA key length for the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is 2048 bits. Keys submitted for certification must be at least 1024 bits.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation

No stipulation.

6.1.7 Parameter quality checking

No stipulation.

6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation

No stipulation.

6.1.9 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority root-certificate defined keyUsage extensions "digitalSignature", "certificateSign", and "cRLSign" in the X.509v3 certificate extensions. The X.509 basic constraints is set to "CA:true". The Netscape certificate type is set to "SSL CA", "S/MIME CA", and "Object signing CA".

The certificates issued by the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority under this policy will have the basic constraints set to "CA:false", and the keyUsage bits set to "digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, dataEncipherment, keyEncipherment". The Netscape cert type is set to "server, client, email".

The keyUsage field may be marked as critical on request of the subscriber.

6.2 Private Key Protection

6.2.1 Standards for cryptographic module

No stipulation.

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

Not applicable.

6.2.3 Private key escrow

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority keys are not given in escrow. The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is also not available for accepting escrow copies of keys of other parties.

6.2.4 Private key backup

The private keys of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority are backup up on encrypted removable magnetic media, stored in a securely controlled environment.

6.2.5 Private key archival

Backup copies made are never destroyed and may be used as an archival service.

6.2.6 Private key entry into cryptographic module

The private key of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority is stored in encrypted form only, and protected by a pass phrase of at least 15 characters.

6.2.7 Method of activating private key

The activation of the CA private key is by providing the pass phrase, which is at least 15 characters long.

6.2.8 Method of deactivating private key

No stipulation.

6.2.9 Method of destroying private key

After termination of the CA and after the archival period for archives has expired, all media that contain the private key of the CA will be securely and permanently destroyed, according to then best current practice.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1 Public key archival

In principle all issued certificates are archived. Test certificates and certificates that upon generating them turn out to be faulty but that have not yet been distributed, are deleted without archiving them. Once the certificate reaches the world outside the CA signing machine, it can be revoked but not deleted.

6.3.2 Usage periods for the public and private keys

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority has a root certificate that expires on the 9th of February, 2006. The exact time of expiration may vary slightly, when changes are committed in the extensions section of the DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority root certificate.

6.4 Activation Data

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

All pass phrases used by the CA have a length of at least 15 characters, and are suitably strong according to current best practice.

6.4.2 Activation data protection

All pass phrases are known to all current staff members of the CA. Change of staff will imply change of pass phrases.

6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data

No stipulation.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

The CA machine used for signing is maintained at a appropriate level of security by applying relevant security patches. It is not connected to any kind of network, and unauthorised physical access is prohibited.

The systems used by the CA to hold on-line repositories are maintained at a high level of security by applying all recommended and applicable security patches. The machine(s) are protected by a suitable firewall.

6.5.2 Computer security rating

No stipulation.

6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1 System development controls

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority uses only open-source software, specifically OpenSSL, that are under continuous scrutiny by the public expert community. It will not itself involve in the development of cryptographic software.

6.6.2 Security management controls

Software installed on the ca signing system is periodically checked for integrity by comparing strong cryptographic message digests. Firmware and hardware are not explicitly checked for correct operations.

6.6.3 Life cycle security ratings

No stipulation.

6.7 Network Security Controls

Certificates are issued on a machine not connected to any kind of data network.

6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

No stipulation.

VII CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES

7.1 Certificate Profile

7.1.1 Version number(s)

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will issue X.509 certificates at version 3.

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The following extensions will be set appropriately in entity certificates:

basicConstraints (critical) Not a CA.

keyUsage digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncypherment, dataEncypherment.

subjectKeyIdentifier hash

authorityKeyIdentifier keyid, issuer:always

subjectAltName e-mail address, when requested by subscriber

cRLDistributionPoints URI

nsCaPolicyURL URL

certificatePolicies OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.10434.4.2.1.2.0

nsComment a descriptive string with reference to the CP/CPS

nsCertType server, client, email

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

No stipulation.

7.1.4 Name forms

See section 3.1.2.

7.1.5 Name constraints

See section 3.1.2.

7.1.6 Certificate policy Object Identifier

This policy is identified by 1.3.6.1.4.1.10434.4.2.1.2.0.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension

No stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

No stipulation.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy extension

The qualifier is a URI pointing to this document.

7.2 CRL Profile

7.2.1 Version number(s)

The DutchGrid medium-security Certification Authority will issue version 1 CRLs.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

No stipulation.

VIII SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

8.1 Specification change procedures

Minor editorial changes to this document can be made without announcement to subscribers, relying parties of cross-certifying CA's. Substantial changes in policy or changes in the technical security controls will be notified to all relevant relying parties, all cross-certifying CA's and to the public on-line repositories. It will also be announced on the DataGrid CA mailing list.

8.2 Publication and notification policies

This policy and any older versions are available from the on-line repository mentioned in section 1.4.

8.3 CPS approval procedures

No stipulation.

IX VERSIONS

9.1 Change log

version 1.0 drafted February 2001

version 1.5 changed may 15th, 2001

version 2.0 alpha drafted September 23-24, 2001.